Thursday, August 25, 2011

THE SPYMASTER OF MONTE CARLO 40: WISHY-WASHY



I arrived in Monaco on January 5th (2006) with my report on Philippe NARMINO in hand.

Early next morning, Prince Albert called to say, “One, I’m back [from Cape Town and a hunting lodge in Ethiopia], two, I’m sorry [for not getting back to you before Christmas], and three, I can’t remember.”

I set out on foot for a 9:15 a.m. meeting with Jean-Luc ALLAVENA (JLA) at the Palace, and saw the chef de cabinet’s office for the first time. This space was rather different from JLA’s corporate office in Paris--about one-fifth the size. As for breakfast: one bottle of Evian water, for which the Palace canteen charged three euros.

I presented my report on NARMINO; JLA read it voraciously.

People talk in Monaco. Gossip runs rampant. There is no doubt that rumormongering is the principality’s national pastime. Throw in job jostling, backstabbing, and personal agendas, and one has a prescription for misinformation, disinformation and outright lies.

But there is a difference between idle or deceptive chatter in bars and hairdressing salons and reports produced by trained professional police intelligence officers. (The former is counter-productive, but the latter crucial for informed decision-making.)

While it is true that intelligence is only as good as the sources who provide it, it is also true that professional intelligence officers give great care to assessing both the information they receive and the credibility of the sources from whom they receive it. When the system occasionally goes wrong (i.e. WMD in Iraq), it is because governments and politicians sometimes select what they wish to hear or interpret ambiguous reporting their own way.

Good intelligence is not based on hearing a rumor from one source, writing it down, and reporting it to the decision-maker. Good intelligence is an objective process that takes many weeks or months of collection from multiple sources, followed by careful analysis.

Intelligence collection is only the first phase of what an intelligence service must do. The next phase--the ongoing evaluation of sources, the questioning of their motives and assessment of their reporting--is next. And after that, one must analyze what has been collected.

Sometimes, like life itself, raw intelligence simply does not make sense. But that does not mean one disregards the nonsensical because it doesn’t fit into a paradigm or theory or slot. This isn’t a novel or a movie, where all the pieces must fit and ultimately provide resolution with all loose ends neatly tied. A source may be right about one thing and wrong about another, either because he/she has been misled or because he/she is trying to mislead—or he/she is trying to inject his/her own opinion disguised as fact.

Collection, assessment and analysis are an ongoing process with the objective to cross-source, validate, nail down the facts and, ultimately, provide informed recommendations to those who make decisions.

Which brings us to the case of Philippe Narmino.

While we realize a decision must be made imminently on whether or not to appoint Narmino to a very senior government job, our investigation of him remains incomplete. Unanswered questions persist. If Narmino has engaged in corrupt practices, and if indeed there are special interests that believe they have Narmino in their pocket, his appointment as head of Monaco’s judicial service will endanger the principality and the reign of Prince Albert II.

(One point has become very clear through our investigation of Narmino:The officers of SIGER are frightened of the harm Narmino can cause to their careers. This has hampered our investigation from the beginning. In addition, we are investigating others who are close to Narmino and who believe that he is their “get-out-of-jail-free” card. Hence, whether Narmino is appointed or not, SIGER should be given insulation to investigate government officials without fear of retribution,)

Thus followed a devastating catalog of alleged impropriety, conflict of interest, grand theft and fraud.

JLA summoned Claude PALMERO, the Palace accountant, to join us in his office for a discussion of this report.

PALMERO read the report in front of me.

When he came upon the phrase “Get-out-of-jail-free card,” PALMERO nodded excitedly. “Yes, I have seen this! MARUANI [Narmino’s special friend] got out of jail free when he was implicated in the Hobbs-Melville scandal.”(PALMERO should talk. He was the Hobbs-Melville accountant. And he meant Christophe MORONI, not MARUANI.)

Continued PALMERO, about Prince Rainier: “He wasn’t even a shadow of himself during the last two-to-three years. He wasn’t there. He could not even discuss his own personal affairs. He signed whatever Madame Francine SIRI [Rainier’s personal secretary, some say mistress, through whom he is thought to have fathered an illegitimate son] put before his eyes.”

This was the period when those around Rainier, who had become feeble-minded, exploited his weakness, his ill health and mental incapacity, and ran rampant with awards and Monegasque passports and job appointments and future job promises.

And where was the Hereditary Prince Albert during that time?

The courtesans kept him busy, in the dark and on the road, where he happily traveled the world, not responsible for substantive decisions in Monaco--and irresponsible in his behavior, enticed by the likes of Robert MUNSCH and others to behave like a college freshman well into his forties.

JLA had already spoken with President Jacques CHRIAC's chef de cabinet and prepared the French for the possibility that Narmino would not get the job and they would be asked to propose someone suitable.

But JLA phoned me late that evening to say the Prince was inclined to proceed with Narmino’s appointment on the basis of “no evidence,” pending a meeting with me at the weekend.

Said JLA sardonically, “He [NARMINO] hasn’t killed anyone, has he?”

This was not about evidence. This was about doubt. And we had darn good reason to doubt Narmino’s suitability as chief of judicial services.

The Prince arrived at M-Base at 7:30 next evening. He and I talked, one-on-one, for two-and-a-half-hours over martinis and sandwiches.

Evidence versus doubt: If NARMINO was under criminal investigation, I reasoned, they would of course need evidence to arrest and convict him. But doubt about his honesty was enough to preclude appointment to a job.And this was not just any job, but a top job as chief of judicial services, a service based upon honesty and integrity. We had a hell of a lot of doubt about Narmino’s honesty and his integrity. By not appointing him, I argued, the Prince risked a few days political flack. But such an appointment could potentially haunt his reign for many years.

“You are on a roll,” I counseled, “and building momentum, with Franck BIANCHERI and with Mark THATCHER. Don’t brake now.”

“But it’s something my father started,” the Prince countered.

“It wasn’t your father,” I replied. “It was the people around him—the crowd that needs to be cleaned out.” I added that the French wouldn’t care, that they would actually applaud the Prince’s strength and willingness to be his own ruler instead of operating in the shadow of a corpse. As for the Prince’s subjects in Monaco, not appointing NARMINO would send shockwaves, indeed—but they would be positive shockwaves,undoing what those around Rainier conspired to achieve after his death.

I concluded my impassioned plea, and the Prince agreed with me.

But as I discovered, it was one thing to secure the wishy-washy Prince’s agreement, and quite another to expect him to abide by it. For Albert was usually steered by the person with whom he last spoke.